and other noneconomic, nonstate actors who are quite diverse in their modes of organization and their goals. As a group, they can be called civil society organizations. Defining the subject in this way allows more systematic investigation of the nature of their relations with state-based actors and political society, especially important in assessing the quality of democratization, and with economic actors like business associations and unions. To examine how developments in the civil society arena are linked to processes of democratization and economic liberalization, the conceptual territory of democratic representational regimes will first be defined and mapped out. A comparative case study of civil society in Argentina and Brazil will then assess the consequences of different representational regimes for the quality of Latin American democracies.
Representational Regimes
Representation is important in any democratic regime because it relates the expressed preferences of the ruled with the choices and policies of the rulers. Civil society organizations, like parties and unions, help link citizens and leaders for the purpose of representation. The framework presented here could be used to assess the evolving nature of representation for the other linking actors as well, and a full understanding of current representational regimes in Argentina and Brazil would have to include such actors, although the characterization of the regime might be different for them. Due to limitations of space, it will be applied initially to a comparatively overlooked set of mediating actors, civil society organizations.
All of the four representational regimes discussed here are compatible with the minimal or electoral form of democracy, so democracy is one part of their names (see Table 1 ). The need for qualifiers indicates that electoral mechanisms alone do not account for different kinds of representation, and these qualifiers in turn substantially alter the quality of the democracy in question. The four representational regimes are categorized along two axes, by their dominant actor and their degree of institutionalization of civil society organizations' access to state actors. Representational mechanisms such as corporatism have long been classified by whether they are organized from the top down (within the state) or bottom up (within society). However, the Adversarial democracy is a representational regime that, while organized by societal actors from the bottom up, has relatively low levels of institutionalization.6 Citizens are not controlled by state actors, but neither are they assured a regular channel of access to political decision making. In addition, the state does not protect weaker civil society actors against stronger ones. For example, representation through clientelistic networks depends largely on citizens' trade of political support for favors from highly placed elites, who are not institutionally bound to represent them. Both pluralism and neopluralism are placed in this category. 7 While there are dangers associated with a lack of institutionalization when society is in charge, even less representation is ensured when low institutionalization is coupled with state control of state-society relations. Delegative democracy is a democracy in which state actors are selected democratically but run roughshod over other political institutions.8 Of particular concern is executives' ability largely to ignore representative organizations, from interest groups to parties to the legislative branch itself. Only the interests of the people as perceived by top state actors are taken into account, often with only plebiscitary or even no consultation. Examples of delegative democracy include populist types of authority relations where mobilization from the top down is largely intended to support a leader and does not depend on institutional or autonomous forms of representation.9
High levels of state control coupled with high levels of institutionalized participation produce cooptive democracy. Citizens have access to government elites, but in ways established and maintained by those elites. Far from ignoring civil society, state actors seek to coopt or repress autonomous civil organization. Civil society actors may approach the state, but only by obeying its participatory rules. This representational regime shows clearly that even inclusive institutionalization in and of itself does not enhance the quality of democracy. In Latin America the classic example of such a cooptive democracy is state corporatism, where control and initiative over corporatist arrangements are exerted from the top down by the state. 10 Finally, in deliberative democracy, state actors facilitate social and political dialogue that is broadly equitable and inclusive, that is regularly engaged in, and that carries weight in elite decision-making processes. Political theorists are currently delineating the preconditions and promise of such an approach.11 Their efforts partially fill the gap left by the paucity of historical experiences with deliberative democracy, especially in Latin America. Modes of representation such as societal corporatism, prominent in western Europe and distinguished from state corporatism by its greater impetus from societal actors, approximate some aspects of deliberative democracy but fall short of the theoretical ideals.
How do these representational regimes condition civil society? An emerging con-
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This content downloaded from 138.202. geared to the organizations' ability to generate the funds, training, and access necessary to achieve a high profile and garner political access. Finally, the framing processes of adversarial democracy will be focused more on the common points of reference of a specific set of groups than on a multisectoral vision. Adversarial democracy does not present an incentive structure for groups to develop shared identities that will bind them into stable networks. Therefore, civil society organizations will be less able to achieve goals beyond influence on specific policy issues. In delegative democracy political opportunities will be arbitrary and will depend almost entirely on the actions of populist leaders. Individual relationships will be of considerable importance. Those ignored by political leaders will have little institutional recourse, whether political or judicial. The mobilizing structures under delegative democracy will differ for the sectors that leaders seek as supporters and those they exclude. Leaders may well direct resources toward supporters' organizations, though institutionalization will remain weak. The sectors that are excluded may seek alliances to protest their exclusion but will find organizational solutions. to their predicament difficult to coordinate. Finally, the framing processes of civil society organizations under delegative democracy will repeat the pattern under adversarial democracy: temporary formulation of understandings around particular issues. However, given the exclusion common to many sectors, protest against arbitrary government may become a common frame.
In cooptive democracies the state will provide different kinds of access for different sectors of civil society, with participatory mechanisms established for some and repression for others. State actors will strongly control the scope and form of the access of even those civil society organizations that have direct access to decision making. These arrangements are generally institutionalized beyond the tenure of individual administrations. Cooptive democratic arrangements will favor different mobilizing structures for included and excluded civil society organizations. Special state resources and access for favored organizations will support relatively complex organizational structures, while the dependence on state resources orients the organizations to conventional opportunities for collective action. Among excluded groups, the rigidity and selective inclusion associated with cooptive democracy may spur new protest movements. Civil society organizations in cooptive democracy will develop shared frames stressing the central role of the state in framing collective problems and solutions. As in delegative democracy, excluded actors may also join together within a master frame in demanding broader participation, although their frames could also be fragmented and individualistic.
Finally, in deliberative democracy the political opportunity structure will be both systematically open to civil society organizations and susceptible to their reformulation. 
Research Design and Methodology
The concept of representational regime will be applied through a structured, focused comparison of two Latin American countries that have recently undergone the three transitions: Brazil and Argentina. Under Vargas and Per6n, respectively, these two countries developed the representational regime of cooptive democracy known as state corporatism. In the 1960s their military governments heavily restricted democratic representation. Now their representational regimes are again changing. To assess this change, the three factors identified above as central to the origin and development of contemporary civil society organizations-political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes-will be analyzed. The general approach of this article is historical institutionalism. In particular, it begins with the premise that institutions of interest representation structure the preferences and strategies of the actors within them. In addition, historical institutionalism assumes a stickiness of institutional arrangements that helps set trajectories for future political choices and arrangements. Thus, the past experiences of interest representation in these two cases should have an impact on current representational regimes, although "political choices, strategies, and contingencies remain central determinants of social and economic processes, and their meaning and consequences perhaps gain even greater relevance in a conjuncture of deep economic crises and transformations."13 Although many institutional approaches do not give adequate attention to the central framing processes that help nonstate actors interpret and construct their alternative courses of action, they are considered important here.
Brazil
The Brazilian transition from military to civilian rule developed gradually and unevenly. Elections and parties were constrained throughout the military period. For Brazilian civil society organizations, the mobilizing frame since 1985 has been citizenship.45 This master frame goes well beyond the political meaning of citizenship to social and economic inclusion as central indicators of its presence. Citizenship, as used by Brazilian civil society organizations, is a social justice rights claim. Civil society organizations claim citizenship for themselves, and they use their access to the political system to push for citizenship for groups that continue to be excluded. This frame has proven to be remarkably adaptable, motivating all of the mobilizations discussed above. First articulated during the constituent assembly mobilizations which marked the political transition, this conception of citizenship was equally appropriate for civil society's responses to the second, economic transition. 46 The antihunger campaigns of 1993 and 1994 called themselves Action of Citizenship against Hunger, Misery and for Life. The frame has also helped establish links to a part of the business community that is committed to both economic prosperity and social justice. The citizenship frame is obviously both broad and compelling enough to sustain national links within civil society over quite long periods of time. As the concept is defined in Brazil, it also necessarily links all three sectors: state, economy, and civil society. It is a deliberative democracy frame that can not easily be turned to supporting state control over representation, since its emphasis is on equitable participation and inclusion. cate that Brazil has some tendencies towards a deliberative representational regime. However, as in Argentina, the amount of state control in organizing society continues to be at issue. Argentina's lower levels of societal control and institutionalization indicate that, with certain sectoral exceptions, it tends more towards a delegative or adversarial regime, pointing to a lack of democratic consolidation within the civil society arena. But the very lack of institutionalization of state control may provide some room for societal maneuver in the future. Particularly because of the history of state control in both countries, institutionalization in and of itself is not an absolute political good but must be weighted by its impact on all actors in a democracy.
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